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THE 80 PERCENT PENSION FUNDING TARGET, HIGH ASSUMED RETURNS, AND
GENERATIONAL INEQUITY

I. Introduction
Expenditures on school pensions have doubled in the last decade and now exceed $1,000
per pupil (Costrell, 2015a). The rise largely reflects payments on unfunded liabilities. The lack
of political will to fully address these liabilities has been abetted by two ideas: (1) full funding is
unnecessary for “sustainability” – 80 percent is good enough; and (2) high assumed returns (e.g.
8 percent) are also sustainable, even if returns have fallen short of late. The purpose of this paper
is to formally analyze two policies – an “x-percent funding policy” and a “high assumed return
policy” (which is often thought of as an “x-percent funding policy” by the backdoor). Using the
simple mathematics of ordinary difference equations, I focus on the existence, stability, and
characteristics of steady state (SS) – most notably the SS degree of generational inequity.
What is the empirical and policy motivation for formally exploring these questions?

To

be clear, there are almost no plans that explicitly build a target funded ratio of less than 100
percent into their funding formula, so the motivation here is not to analyze such funding
formulas actually in use.1 Instead, one motivation – a modest one – is to simply show how such
a target ratio would play out, were it to be incorporated into an otherwise standard funding
formula. More importantly, quite a number of plans that target full funding have fallen well
short of meeting that target for many years, and have often used the 80 percent rationale to avoid
taking corrective action.2 The two main reasons for the shortfalls (Munnell, et. al, 2015;

1

The exceptions here are the five state systems of Illinois, of which the Teacher Retirement System is the largest.
Under Illinois statute, the 2045 target is 90 percent. In addition to the target itself, the method by which that target is
built into the funding formula is quite non-standard – unlike the method modeled below. The actuary for Illinois’
funds has repeatedly criticized these non-standard practices, as “Illinois math” (Teachers’ Retirement System of the
State of Illinois, 2016 and earlier). There are other states that have built 80-percent triggers into their COLAs.
2
See the statements of New Jersey and Connecticut policy-makers cited in American Academy of Actuaries, 2012.
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Costrell, 2015b) are (i) the failure to make actuarially required contributions; and (ii) overly
optimistic actuarial assumptions -- notably the assumed investment return -- which artificially
depress required contributions in the short run. The incentive to rectify such shortfalls depends
critically on the debate over whether 80 percent (or some similar figure) is “good enough.” With
regard to (i), the “x-percent funding policy” model below may be interpreted as a formal analysis
of underfunding “as if” a funded ratio of less than 100 percent had been built into the formula.
With regard to (ii), the “high assumed returns” model below is directly pertinent to existing
practice. Both policies have strong implications for generational inequity.
Before delving into the analysis, I will first review the background and literature on the
“80 percent standard” and the rationale for my formal analytical approach. The new results from
that approach will be summarized below, but the main policy implication can be stated here:
small departures of the policy variables from sound practice – target funded ratios below 100
percent and high assumed returns -- result in large SS underfunding and generational inequity.

II. Background and Previous Literature on the “80 Percent” Standard
Continuing public pension funding shortfalls, years after the market crash of 2008, have
given circulation to the notion that “full funding” is unnecessary for a “healthy” pension plan. A
particularly common form of this idea is the “80 percent” standard, according to which
professional opinion allegedly views an 80 percent funded ratio (assets/liabilities) as the
threshold for a sound plan (see the Appendix of American Academy of Actuaries, 2012, for
examples). The origins of this standard are obscure, and possibly mythical (see Miller, 2012;
and reply by Brainard and Zorn, 2012). Indeed, there is now a website, the “80 Percent Pension
Funding Hall of Shame” (Campbell, 2014) and associated database, devoted to exposing those
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public officials and pension industry participants who perpetuate this “standard.” That said, the
claim does raise questions of the precise sense in which a certain minimum funded ratio indicates
a fund’s “health,” or, more specifically, its “sustainability.” Can target ratios below 100 percent
be “sustainable,” and, if so, how far below 100 percent, and what are the consequences?
Some observers of the public pension industry have astutely clarified the main issues
with the “80 percent standard.” Notably, Miller (2012) makes two key distinctions. First, he
points out that it is one thing to hit 80 percent funding at the bottom of the market, while still
averaging 100 percent over the cycle by (for example) reaching 125 percent at the peak.3 It is
quite another matter to average well below 100 percent indefinitely. The American Academy of
Actuaries (2012) makes a similar (though not identical) distinction between a 100 percent target
ratio for actuarial funding (which they recommend) and an 80 percent snapshot at a point in time,
which may or may not be on track to reach the 100 percent target.
The second distinction Miller makes concerns the criteria for plan health: sustainability
vs. generational equity.4 Even if the plan averages below 100 percent indefinitely, it may still be
“sustainable” at contribution rates that cover amortization of the unfunded liability. However,
this runs afoul of generational equity, with “current taxpayers supporting retirees who didn’t ever
work for them” and/or the employees paying down previous cohorts’ unfunded liabilities.
Still, confusion remains in publications of public pension industry spokesmen (let alone
the general public and policy-makers). The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA,
2009) specifies a target funded ratio of “100 percent or more” as the first required practice for
“sustainable funding.” As Miller has clarified, this is actually a requirement for generational

3

However, as Miller points out, funded ratios above 100 percent create a political problem, tempting lawmakers to
take pension holidays or enhance benefits.
4
American Academy of Actuaries (2012) also alludes to this distinction.
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equity, rather than sustainability. However, the water was further muddied by spokesmen for
the National Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA) and the prominent
actuarial firm Gabriel, Roeder, Smith & Company (GRS). In a joint statement of these two
entities (replying, in part, to Miller), Brainard and Zorn (2012) reiterate GFOA’s
recommendation of 100 percent target funding for sustainability, but then suggest it is not critical
to ever reach that target: “many pension plans remain underfunded for decades without causing
fiscal stress for the plan sponsor or requiring benefits to be reduced.” For them, the “critical
factor” in evaluating plan health is whether or not the required contributions are so high as to
create “fiscal stress.” More to the point, their statement seems to ratify an x-percent standard as
a rationale for inaction in addressing the sources of underfunding, whether it is failure to meet
required contributions or overly optimistic assumed investment return.

III. Rationale for the Formal Analytical Approach and Summary of Results
This paper brings a simple analytical model to bear on these issues. Although recently
developed simulation models incorporate risk and other features, insight into the questions posed
here can be obtained by a model stripped to its essentials (e.g., risk-free investment) and solvable
from a simple ordinary difference equation. For example, the notion of “sustainability” – a term
that is often used without precise definition – is logically defined in such a model as stability of a
steady state, at an equilibrium funded ratio and contribution rate.
The first benefit of such a model is to sort out formally who is right and who is wrong in
the commentaries discussed above. Miller is right: SS funded ratios below 100 percent are
“sustainable,” if generationally inequitable, in a precise mathematical sense. There is a
continuum of stable (“sustainable”) steady states. There is no x-percent minimum for the SS
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funded ratio in this model, other than the 0-percent criterion of solvency. Low SS funded ratios
correspond to high SS contribution rates, exceeding normal cost (the cost of pre-funding each
cohort’s benefits). The problem with x-percent funding, therefore, is generational inequity, not
“sustainability.” The model helps us better understand how this result obtains, showing that the
system’s stability is unrelated to the funding target, and identifying instead the features of an
actuarial funding formula that are required to secure stability.
The model also generates additional results not previously articulated. My model
generates a simple, powerful relationship between the SS unfunded ratio and a meaningful
measure of generational inequity. The model also provides deeper understanding of the SS
funded ratio itself. I show that if a system targets an x-percent funded ratio in its amortization
formula, the SS ratio will be lower yet. That is because contributions at the x-percent target
include no amortization, and normal cost alone is insufficient to sustain that target. Conversely,
to achieve any given SS funded ratio, one must set a higher target funded ratio for amortization
purposes. As a corollary of this result, to merely achieve solvency (0 percent SS ratio) the target
ratio must be set at a positive floor. To take that extreme case, if the target ratio is set at that
lower bound, the resulting steady state reproduces a pay-go system, under the guise of a prefunding formula, with amortization payments making up the difference between the pay-go rate
and the normal cost of pre-funding benefits. More generally, the math simplifies nicely to allow
easy calibration of the relationship between the SS ratio and the funding target, and to
demonstrate its sensitivity. Indeed, some proposed targets are alarmingly close to the floor for
SS solvency, which also shows how great the inequity can be under proposed targets. Finally, I
model the policy of high assumed returns, 5 which inflates the funded ratio. The model shows

5

There has been considerable controversy over the assumed rate of return and its use for discounting liabilities. The
debate distinguishes between the accounting rate used for reporting liabilities – which should be the risk-free rate,
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that even the inflated ratio is underfunded in SS, let alone the true ratio, for reasons that are not
always understood. Moreover, the measured SS degree of generational inequity will exceed that
based on the measured SS unfunded ratio. The main policy takeaway is that small deviations
from the target of full funding or of the assumed from true returns generate large degrees of
generational inequity.

IV. The Basic Model
Consider a population of public employees (e.g., “teachers”) in a traditional defined
benefit plan, such as a "final-average-salary" plan, where the initial annuity equals years of
service × "multiplier" × final average salary. For example, with a multiplier of 2.0 percent, after
serving 30 years one may receive 60 percent of final average salary for life, plus any COLAs.
The basic pension funding math can be set out with the following notation:
Wt = payroll in period t, the product of salary and number of teachers
G = Wt/Wt-1 = 1 + growth rate of payroll
R = 1 + return on investment (assumed to be certain)
ct = contribution to pension fund, as fraction of payroll, in period t (joint: employer and
employee), to be specified further below.
cn = "normal cost," fraction of payroll to pre-fund pension
cp = "pay-go cost," fraction of payroll to pay annual pension benefits
At = assets in pension fund, at end of period t
Lt = accrued liabilities of the pension fund, at end of period t
ft = At/Lt, funded ratio at end of period t

rather than the assumed return on investment -- and the rate used for funding purposes. In this paper, my focus is
the funding system, so I do not distinguish between the assumed return and the liability discount rate.
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Note that R is taken as constant, as my focus here is not the role of market fluctuations. In
addition, G, cn, and cp are taken as constants.6 In doing so, I am assuming the population is in
steady-state (a “mature” population, to use the actuarial term), so that I can focus on the behavior
of funding, in and out of steady-state, to determine its “sustainability.”
The timing sequence of the model is this: during period t, teachers receive total payroll
Wt from taxpayers; teachers and taxpayers jointly contribute ctWt to the fund; retirees receive
pension benefits of cpWt from the fund; and the fund earns returns R on the end-of-previousperiod balance, At-1. Thus, the fund evolves as:
(1)

At = RAt-1 + (ct - cp)Wt.
The accrued liability at time t is the present value of accrued benefits to be paid in the

future, which, for a mature population, grows in step with payroll, at rate G. It can also be
expressed as the prior liability grown by R (since the previously accrued benefits are one year
closer), plus the current accrual of new benefits -- normal cost -- less the benefits paid out:7
(2)

Lt = GLt-1 = RLt-1 + (cn - cp)Wt.

Substituting Lt-1 = Lt/G on the RHS and solving, we have:
(3)

Lt = [G/(R-G)](cp – cn)Wt.

This steady-state relationship between accrued liabilities and payroll will be quite useful below.
It represents the difference between the present value of all future benefit payments and all future

6

As a special case, one may consider a simple two-period model, with overlapping generations (OLG) (Samuelson,
1958; Diamond, 1965). Each generation of public employees works for one period (e.g. 30 years) and then retires
(also for 30 years). In this simple model, let p represent one’s pension, as a fraction of prior salary. Then cn = p/R,
cp = p/G, and Lt = pWt/R, where R and G are now understood to be (say) 30-year compound rates. With these
expressions, some of the results below simplify, as indicated in corresponding notes.
7
The precise measurement of normal cost varies with actuarial convention in the multi-period case. That is because
the partition of the present value of all future benefits between those that have already accrued and those yet to be
accrued depends on conventions regarding when to recognize projected service and wage growth based on current
and prior service and wages. To fix ideas, one may consider entry age normal (EAN), the current standard under
GASB, but the analysis below pertains to other methods as well.
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liability accruals (normal costs).8 These are, respectively, a fraction cp and cn of the present
value of future payroll, [G/(R-G)]Wt.. Note also that since accrued liabilities are positive, the
condition R > G (the relevant case, as discussed below) implies cp > cn. It is more costly to pay
for previous cohorts’ pension than to pre-fund one’s own, if previous cohorts are not small (G is
not high) and/or the return to investment R is high.

A General Result on Generational Inequity in Steady State
The system’s dynamic behavior will depend on the funding formula governing
contributions, ct, but even before specifying that formula, we can derive the steady-state
relationship between the contribution rate and the funded ratio. Since Lt grows at rate G, so must
At, for the funded ratio ft to be constant at its steady-state value, call it f*. From (1), this means
the SS contribution rate, c*, must satisfy:
(4)

G = At/At-1 = R + (c* - cp)Wt/At-1 = R + (c* - cp)Wt/(f*Lt-1) = R + (c* - cp)Wt/(f*Lt/G).

Substituting from (3) and solving, we have a fairly general result:
(5)

c* = cn + (cp - cn)(1 – f*).

The first term on the RHS, the normal cost, is the cost of prefunding any cohort’s future benefits.
The second term represents each generation’s contribution over and above what is required to
pay for its own benefits. More specifically, (cp - cn) represents the potential extra burden
imposed on the current cohort to fund the benefits of prior cohorts. The fraction of that burden
paid in steady-state, (1 – f*), may be considered a measure of generational inequity. At full
funding (f* = 1), that burden is zero; at the opposite extreme (f* = 0), the full burden is borne, so

8

This follows from the basic identity given in the previous note that the present value of all future benefit payments
equals the present value of all benefits yet to be accrued and the present value of all benefits previously accrued, but
not yet paid out. The latter term is the accrued liability.
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c* = cp. That is, we have a strikingly simple result for generational inequity: the extra annual
burden borne by each cohort (a flow variable) is the SS unfunded ratio (a ratio of stock variables)
times the difference between the pay-go rate and the normal cost.
In the remainder of this paper, I will examine the determinants of the SS funded ratio f*
(and, hence, the degree of generational inequity, through the result just established), under the
two policies in question: x-percent funding and high assumed returns. First, however, I examine
the issue of stability, since steady state is of little interest unless it is stable. Indeed, going back
to the debate over these policies, our understanding of the term “sustainable” is that a meaningful
steady state exists, and it is stable.9

Stability
The dynamic of the funded ratio, ft = At/Lt, is found by using (1)-(3):
(6)

ft = At/Lt = RAt-1/GLt-1 + (ct – cp)Wt/Lt = (R/G)ft-1 + [(R-G)/G](ct – cp)/(cp - cn).

The system evolves from the initial condition f0 based on the sequence of contribution rates ct.
Consider briefly the case of exogenous c, to see why it must be endogenized, in accord
with standard actuarial practice. If ct is fixed at c, (6) is a one-variable linear difference equation,
with steady state funded ratio, f* = (c – cp)/(cn – cp) and solution ft = (R/G)t(f0 - f*) + f*. The
stability condition is R < G. Specifically, as is well-established in the OLG literature, if R < G,
pay-go (c = cp) is sustainable: contributions cover pension payments with no need to hold any
balance in the fund (f* = 0). If the funded ratio is positive to begin with, it will shrink toward

GFOA (2009) implicitly characterizes a “sustainable” plan as one where “contributions … expressed as a
percentage of active member payroll … remain approximately level from one year to the next.”
9

9

zero. Any higher contribution rate, c > cp, is inefficient,10 and leads to unnecessary asset
accumulation (f* > 0).
The problem is that typically R > G. Indeed, this assumption has guided pension policy
for the last few decades.11 Certainly once the baby boomers entered the workforce, actuaries and
economists reading the demography reports knew the baby bust would require moving from paygo to pre-funding (generally starting in the vicinity of 1980). The actuarially assumed rate of
return on public pension funds currently averages 7.7 percent, in the Public Plans Data of the
Boston College Center for Retirement Research,12 exceeding the average assumed rate of payroll
growth of about 3.7 percent.13 With R > G, the system is unstable for constant c. The funded
ratio would veer off to plus/minus infinity, as f0 >< f* = (cp – c)/(cp – cn). Specifically, the normal
cost is less than pay-go, but if contributions were simply set to cn (so f* = 1), the system would
collapse for any starting balance f0 < 1.

V. Target Funded Ratio < 100 Percent
Endogenizing the Contribution Rate: Stability
Contributions need to be endogenous to address the stability problem when R > G.
Standard actuarial funding formulas do so through contributions that annually amortize some
portion of unfunded liabilities, after paying normal cost. In this way, contributions are adjusted

10

Conversely to the case discussed above, R < G means cp < cn. It is cheaper to pay for previous cohorts' pension
than to pre-fund one's own, if the previous cohort is small (G is high) and/or the return to investment R is low. Of
course, this literally requires growth at rate G forever, so that no "last generation" gets stuck holding the bag.
11
It is also a standard result from growth theory, although Piketty (2014) created something of a stir by finding this
result in the historical record. See Mankiw (2015).
12
This is the unweighted FY13 estimate, as reported for 145 of the 150 state and local plans covered; the assetweighted estimate is almost identical. It is also equal to the national average for state and local pensions, from the
Census of Governments, as reported by the Boston College Retirement Center (accessed January 8, 2016). The
assumed rate has been reduced in recent years for a number of plans, but the national average from the Census of
Government has not dropped much, from 7.98 percent in 2003 to 7.64 percent in 2013.
13
This is both the weighted and unweighted FY13 estimate, as reported for 42 of the 150 plans covered.
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over time, with the intention of steering the funded ratio back toward a stable target. Consider
the following stylized model of actuarially required contributions, as a fraction of payroll:
(7)

ct = cn + s(f°Lt-1 - At-1)/Wt

The second term is the amortization payment. Normally it is a fraction, s, of the difference
between liabilities and assets (as most recently measured), but I have slightly generalized it here
to allow for an x-percent target funded ratio f°.
There are two potential rationales for this formulation (even though there are no plans
that formally embed a target ratio below 100 percent in this fashion14). First, if plans were to
formalize a target below 100 percent within a standard formula, this would seem to be the natural
way to do it. (As I will show, however, for this to work, f° would have to be set higher than the
true target.) A second rationale pertains to an observed practice, where the funded ratio persists
at less than 100 percent due to shortfalls in contributions, but authorities take no corrective
action, falling back on the “80 percent” rule for a rationale. In that case, (7) may be thought of
as an implicit funding formula, modeling contributions “as if” f° < 1 were embedded in it.
Using (3), we can write (7) as:15
(8)

ct = cn + s(f° - ft-1)(Lt-1/GWt-1) = cn + s(f° - ft-1)(cp – cn)/(R-G).

Substituting (8) into (6) and simplifying, we have
(9)

ft = (R/G)ft-1 + [(R-G)/G][s(f° - ft-1)/(R-G) - 1] = [(R-s)/G]ft-1 + [sf° – (R - G)]/G
Thus, we have again characterized the system with a simple linear difference equation.

The stability condition is now (R-s)/G < 1, which can be met by setting the speed of amortization
s > R – G. In this way, amortization payments will exceed the growth-adjusted interest on the

14

The Illinois plans that formalize a 90 percent target do so in a non-standard formula that works backward from a
fixed (but distant) target year. According to the actuaries for the Illinois state plans (who dub the state’s funding
formula as “Illinois math”), the funding method effectively sets a lower target than the standard method.
15
In the 2-period case this simplifies to ct = cn + s(f° - ft-1)cn/G.
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(target) unfunded liability. Conversely, to prevent oscillation, one would not want to over-adjust
by setting s > R, which would more than pay off the (target) unfunded liability in one period.16
Thus, the economically meaningful range is s Є (R-G, R].17 Note that the stability condition is
independent of the target funded ratio. This contrasts with the suggestion that an 80-percent
funded ratio (or some other figure) is tied to the “sustainability” of the system.18

Steady State
The steady-state funded ratio, derived from (9), is:
(10)

f* = [sf° - (R - G)]/[s - (R - G)].

If the target is full-funding (f°=1), then the steady-state will indeed be full funding (f*=1).
However, if the target is for less than full-funding, the steady-state ratio will be lower yet.19 That
is, if the target is set to 80 percent funding, the actual steady state will be lower than 80 percent.
The reason is that once we reach 80 percent, amortization will be zero, so contributions will
simply cover normal cost (ct = cn), which is not enough to sustain steady state unless we are at
full funding. Indeed, the meaning of contributing normal cost is that each cohort has prefunded

16

Consider the borderline case s = R. If the target is full funding, then, as (9) shows, for any funded ratio ft-1,
contributions over the next period brings ft back to unity. More generally, for f° < 1, the steady state, given below,
will also be attained in one period. For the other borderline case, s = R - G, ft will either remain stationary at any
arbitrary level (if f° = 1) or will decline indefinitely (if f° < 1); as shown below, there is no well-defined steady state.
17
The two conditions can be written as: R(f°Lt-1 - At-1) ≥ (ct - cn)Wt > (R-G)(f°Lt-1 - At-1). The first term is principal
plus interest on the (target) UAL, the middle term is the amortization payment (from (7)), and the last term is the
growth-adjusted interest on the (target) unfunded liability. One does not need to pay full interest for the funded ratio
to be stable, since payroll growth alone will erode the unfunded ratio.
18
The behavior of the funded ratio, (9), is also independent of the relationship between c p and cn, unlike the more
general formulation given in (6). That is, the conventional actuarial formula for contributions, slightly generalized
in (8), eliminates the terms in cp and cn from the funded formula dynamic, since (ct – cp) in (6) is now proportional to
(cp - cn). Specifically, this follows from the fact that normal cost, net of pay-go cost appears on both the liability
accrual (2) and asset accrual (1) under contribution formula (7).
19
From (10), f*[s - (R - G)] = [sf° - (R - G)] < f°[s - (R - G)] for f° < 1, since R > G, so f* < f°.
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its benefits, so that f = 1. If ft-1 = f° < 1, so that ct = cn (by (8)), the funded ratio will fall20 (and
contributions will rise) until f approaches the steady state given in (10), f* < f° < 1.
Conversely, policy-makers may still achieve a "sustainable" funded ratio less than one,
but to do so one must set the target funded ratio for amortization purposes (f°) between the true
target and unity. That is, if the true target is 80 percent, the amortization target must be set
higher than 80 percent.
As a corollary, if the true target is zero percent (i.e. barely solvent), the target ratio for
amortization must be set somewhat greater than zero. That is, there is a positive floor for the
amortization target ratio, below which insolvency will ensue. Specifically, (10) shows that f* =
0 for f°= f°min ≡ (R-G)/s Є (0, 1). Thus, there is a sense in which one could say that a minimum
x-percent target ratio is necessary. I will calibrate suggested estimates of that floor below to see
how it compares with the 80 percent standard.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the target funded ratio, f°, and the steady
state f*, for a given value of s. The relationship lies below the 45-degree line. This can be read
from the target f° to the consequent steady state, which is lower, or from the steady state one
seeks to the required target for amortization, which is higher. The horizontal intercept is f°min.
[Figure 1 approximately here]
As shown earlier, in (5), the SS contribution rate c* will include a fraction of the extra
burden to fund the benefits of prior cohorts, (cp - cn), and that fraction is the SS unfunded ratio,
(1–f*). The model shows how that fraction is related to the target funded ratio f°. Specifically,
using (10) in (5), the steady-state contribution rate is:
(11)

20

c* = cn + (cp - cn)(1 – f*) = cn + (cp - cn)s(1 – f°)/[s – (R – G)] > cn + (cp - cn)(1 – f°)

It is readily shown, using (6) and ct = cn that for ft-1 = f° < 1, ft < ft-1.
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As the target funded ratio drops from 100 percent to, say, 80 percent, our measure of
generational inequity rises from zero to something greater than 20 percent (indeed, much greater,
as shown below) of the extra burden (cp - cn), since (1-f*) > (1 - f°). In the limiting case, as the
target funded ratio reaches f°min ≡ (R – G)/s, so f* = 0, the full extra burden is born: c* = cp. The
form that extra burden takes is the amortization payment. That is, if we set the target funded
ratio as low as possible, consistent with steady-state solvency, the amortization payments suffice
to top up the normal costs to the pay-go rate. The only difference between this system and the
simple pay-go system is that with R > G, the system with a constant contribution rate is unstable,
while in this system, with s > (R – G), the amortization payments will adjust outside of steadystate to provide stable convergence.

Standard N-Period Amortization and Calibration of Magnitudes
To get more specific (and to calibrate magnitudes), we specify the amortization rate, s,
using a standard actuarial formula. The most common formula is “level percent” of payroll.
Amortization payments are set to grow in step with payroll, at rate G and to pay off the unfunded
liability in N years (usually 30).21 Under the “open” version – commonly used – the N-year
horizon is renewed every year, so the UAL is never fully paid off, but, as shown below, the
funded ratio asymptotically approaches one, or the target ratio. Under this formula,22
(12)

s = (R-G)/[1 – (G/R)N].

Note that this formula will always satisfy the stability condition s Є (R-G, R], as s = R for N = 1
and s → (R – G) as N → ∞.

“Level dollar” amortization is the special case with G = 1.
This assumes that the amortization series starting in period t is set to amortize the UAL of period t-1, with interest
accrued in period t, i.e. the present value of the amortization series starting in period t is R∙UALt-1. The derivation is
a simple application of the sum of a geometric series.
21
22
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Substituting (12) into (9), and simplifying, we have
(13)

ft = {[G – R(G/R)N]/G[1 – (G/R)N]}ft-1 + [(R-G)(f° - 1 + (G/R)N]/G[1 – (G/R)N].

Solving (13) for the steady state, ft = ft-1 = f* (or substituting (12) directly into (10)), we have a
very simple solution, which can be readily calibrated:
(14)

f* = 1 - (1 - f°)(R/G)N.

With the mean actuarial assumptions reported above, R = 1.077 and G = 1.037, and N = 30, if
the target funded ratio were set at 80 percent, the actual steady state would be quite a bit lower:
37.8 percent. Conversely, to achieve a steady state of 80 percent, the target ratio for
amortization purposes would have to be much closer to one: 93.6 percent.
At the other extreme, the minimum target to avoid SS insolvency is f°min = [1 – (G/R)N] =
67.9 percent. Stated differently, a pay-go system can be mimicked with an actuarial funding
formula that sets amortization based on 67.9 percent target funding. Interestingly, some
commentators now state that funding at about 70 percent is good enough.23 If that were
formalized in the amortization formula, the result would be near-insolvency.
Table 1 provides a more expansive picture of the SS funded ratios as a function of the
target funded ratio and (R/G). The bold red row represents (R/G) under the mean actuarial
assumptions above, 1.077/1.037 = 1.039. At this value of (R/G), every percentage point
reduction in the target ratio reduces the SS funded ratio by over 3 points. That is the slope in
Figure 1. Clearly, the SS funded ratio is quite sensitive to variation in the target ratio.
[Table 1 approximately here]

23

Dean Baker co-director of the Center for Economic Policy Research, as reported in Politico and unnamed
“investment analysts” cited in the Baltimore Sun. (“80 Percent Pension Funding Hall of Shame” database)
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We can now calibrate the degree of generational inequity and the same result holds: it is
very sensitive to the target funded ratio. The steady-state contribution rate, given by (5), can be
related directly to the target funded ratio, for given R and G:
(15)

c* = cn + (cp - cn)(1 – f*) = cn + (cp - cn)(1 – f°)(R/G)N.

Just as the SS funded ratio varies by over 3 points for every point in the target ratio (for R/G =
1.039), so too for the SS unfunded ratio, (1 – f*), and, hence, the share of the extra burden to
fund the benefits of prior cohorts. For f° = 80 percent, the share of the extra burden rises not to
20 percent, but to 62.2 percent. At the target ratio of 70 percent, bandied about by some, the SS
result would be nearly complete generational inequity – virtually pay-go.
To be sure, those who invoke an x-percent target no doubt have in mind something like
an SS funded ratio (instead of a target ratio as modeled here). But one may well doubt if they
have a firm idea of how to operationalize that target. The model here suggests how one might
think of plans’ contribution behavior “as if” a target funded ratio were embedded in the
amortization formula, with the ensuing actual funded ratio. To illustrate, consider the national
average, that employer contributions covered only 85.3 percent of ARC in 2013.24 The ARC
rate for these plans averaged 17.6 percent, of which 8.0 percent was the employer normal cost
and 9.6 percent amortization. From these data one can infer that the average plan paid 73.3
percent of the amortization. The same dataset gives f = 74.1 percent. This is “as if” the target
funded ratio f° = 93.1%25 which implies f* = 78.4%, by (14). Thus (perhaps coincidentally),
these data are consistent with the idea that the average plan is acting as if it were content with 80

This is for those plans in Boston College’s Public Plans database whose members are in Social Security (for their
ARCs to be comparable with each other). The figures given are all weighted averages for about 100 plans.
25
The 73.3 percent figure is calculated as (0.853 × 0.176 – 0.080)/0.096, without rounding. The ratio of
amortization “as if” the target ratio were f° to the full-funding amortization is (f° - ft-1)/(1 - ft-1). Setting this to 0.733,
with ft-1 = 0.741 implies f° = 0.931.
24
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percent funding and, implicitly uses the corresponding target ratio to pare back the amortization
payments. Of course, this average masks a wide variation between those plans aiming at fullfunding and those which further reduce contributions, consistent with a much lower steady state.

VI. Assumed Return > R
The previous analysis helps understand the properties of a system that either builds
underfunding into its amortization formula or acts “as if” it has done so by shortchanging the
contributions required to reach full funding, with the rationale that “80 percent is good enough.”
In many plans, however, the main cause of underfunding is that the fund’s assumed return has
exceeded the market return, in recent years. If that gap is temporary and the fund’s performance
is expected to revert to longer term historical norms on which the assumed return is purportedly
based, then the “80 percent” rationale is simply a statement that, while short today, we are still
on track to full funding. However, if we are now in an environment where prospective returns
are lower than previously assumed, and the assumed rate is maintained or only minimally
reduced, than we have a situation analogous to that modeled above, where underfunding is built
into the system, through the back door of the assumed return, and is effectively rationalized with
the 80-percent standard. In this section I formally examine a system where the assumed return
exceeds the true return, and provide new insights into the resulting steady state.
We begin with some additions to the preceding notation:
Rꞌ = 1 + assumed return on investment > R = 1 + true return
cnꞌ = measured normal cost < cn = true normal cost (measured at R)
Lꞌt = measured liabilities, at end of period t < Lt = true liabilities (measured at R)
fꞌt = measured funded ratio at end of period t, At/Lꞌt > ft = true funded ratio
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The dynamic of assets is unchanged from equation (1), since their evolution rests on
actual returns, R. Equations (2) - (3) continue to represent the dynamic of true liabilities, but for
measured liabilities, these analogous expressions hold:
(16)

Lꞌt = GLꞌt-1 = RꞌLꞌt-1 + (cnꞌ - cp)Wt

(17)

Lꞌt = [G/(Rꞌ-G)](cp – cnꞌ)Wt.

Similarly, equation (6) still holds for the dynamic of the true funded ratio, but using (1), (16)(17), we find the following dynamic for the measured funded ratio:
(18)

fꞌt = (R/G)fꞌt-1 + [(Rꞌ-G)/G](ct – cp)/(cp - cnꞌ).
Consider the actuarially-determined contribution rate with amortization speed sꞌ:

(19)

ct = cnꞌ + sꞌ(Lꞌt-1 – At-1)/Wt = cnꞌ + sꞌ(1 – fꞌt-1)(cp – cnꞌ)/(Rꞌ-G),

where the target is full funding, and we have used (17). The immediate impact on contributions
of assuming Rꞌ instead of R is complex, but includes a reduction in measured normal cost and
unfunded ratio; it will be instructive to contrast these with the steady-state impact, below.
Substituting into (18), we have the dynamic for the measured funded ratio:
(20) fꞌt = [(R – sꞌ)/G]fꞌt-1 + [sꞌ + G - Rꞌ]/G.
The stability condition, sꞌ > R – G, is analogous to that of the target funding model.26
Turning to the steady state, it would not be surprising to find that the true funded ratio is
less than one, since it is below the measured ratio, which is targeted for full funding. It may,
however, be surprising that not even the measured ratio – inflated by the higher discount rate for
liabilities -- reaches one in steady state. Solving (20), we have:
(21)

fꞌ* = [sꞌ + G – Rꞌ]/[sꞌ + G - R] < 1 for Rꞌ > R.

Once again, this dynamic does not depend on normal cost (true or measured, c n or cnꞌ) or the cost of benefits (cp).
The reason is the same: normal cost – however measured -- net of pay-go cost appears on both the liability accrual
and asset accrual, so it vanishes from the dynamic of the measured funded ratio.
26
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The reason fꞌ* < 1 may be different from what intuition suggests. Suppose fꞌt-1 = 1. Since we are
at full-funding, as measured using Rꞌ, amortization payments cease and ct = cnꞌ (by (19)). One
might think part (or all) of the problem is that cnꞌ low-balls true normal cost, so the liabilities that
accrue are not fully funded. But that is not the problem. Measured liabilities accrue at cnꞌ, so if
contributions also include normal cost as measured, this is not the reason the measured ratio falls
below 1. As (18) shows, when ct = cnꞌ, the terms in cnꞌ drop out, no matter how normal cost is
measured – even if it were measured accurately. The problem is not in the accruals of measured
liabilities or assets (i.e., contributions), but rather the fact that liabilities are rolled forward at Rꞌ,
while assets (net of contributions) only accumulate at rate R.27 Thus, (20) shows that if fꞌt-1 = 1,
fꞌt drops to 1 – (Rꞌ-R)/G, and will continue dropping until reaching the steady-state in (21).
To calibrate the system, consider the amortization formula (12), with assumed return Rꞌ:
(22)

sꞌ = (Rꞌ-G)/[1 – (G/Rꞌ)N].

Substituting in (20), we have:28
(23)

fꞌt = {[R - R(G/Rꞌ)N – (Rꞌ-G)]/G[1-(G/Rꞌ)N]}fꞌt-1 + (Rꞌ-G)(G/Rꞌ)N/G[1-(G/Rꞌ)N] and

(24)

fꞌ* = (Rꞌ-G)(G/Rꞌ)N/{[(R–G)(G/Rꞌ)N + (Rꞌ-R)}
= (Rꞌ–G)/[(Rꞌ-R)(Rꞌ/G)N + (R–G)] < 1 for Rꞌ > R > G.

Consider first the benchmark case discussed above: Rꞌ = 1.077, G = 1.037, N = 30. If we
suppose that the true return is 0.5 percentage points lower, R = 1.072, the steady-state value of
the measured funded ratio, fꞌ* = 79.1 percent. Thus, if one accepts the 80 percent standard as
“good enough,” one might be willing to maintain an assumed rate of return that is half a

27

Our emphasis here is on the impact of high assumed returns on the growth of measured liabilities, rather than the
impact of low market returns on the growth of assets. That is, unlike some previous literature (Munnell, et al.,
2015; Costrell, 2015b), to assess the impact of Rꞌ > R, the counterfactual here is “what if the assumed return had
been reduced to the true return,” rather than “what if the market had performed up to assumed return?”
28
The coefficient on fꞌt-1 < 1, so that stability condition still holds. For small N (e.g. N = 1), the coefficient goes
negative, so the system becomes oscillatory, but that seems unlikely under conventional choices of N.
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percentage point too high. However, the steady state is very sensitive to the assumed return. If
the true return is a full point lower, fꞌ* = 65.4 percent and if it is two points lower (i.e. 5.7
percent true return), fꞌ* falls below 50 percent.
Table 2 illustrates the sensitivity, by depicting fꞌ* for various values of Rꞌ/G and Rꞌ/R.
The values of Rꞌ/R vary from 1.000 to 1.030, with increments of 0.005, which correspond
approximately to 0.5 percent increments on the spread between Rꞌ and R. Looking across any
given row29 one can see the sensitivity of fꞌ* to the assumed return. The relationship is not linear
(fꞌ* only approaches zero asymptotically), but fꞌ* rapidly falls below 50 percent.
As we have seen above, the steady-state unfunded ratio corresponds directly to the degree
of generational inequity, but for our measured magnitudes with Rꞌ > R, there is a twist. Write the
steady-state contribution rate by substituting (22) into (19):
(25)

c* = cnꞌ + (cp – cnꞌ)(1 – fꞌ*)/[1 – (G/Rꞌ)N].

The potential extra burden of funding prior cohorts is measured as (cp – cnꞌ) and the share of that
actually borne is (1 – fꞌ*)/[1 – (G/Rꞌ)N]. That is, unlike the true burden (given in (5)), each cohort
carries a share of the measured burden that exceeds the measured unfunded ratio. For example,
in our benchmark case (Rꞌ = 1.077, G = 1.037), if Rꞌ exceeds R by half point -- so the steadystate measured funded ratio is about 80 percent -- each cohort carries not 20 percent, but about
30 percent of the (measured) extra burden. At a full point spread, that rises to about 50 percent,
and at a two point spread that goes to about 75 percent.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that even though the initial impact of a policy of high
assumed returns is undoubtedly to reduce contributions (both normal cost and amortization), in
steady-state, it raises contributions over what they would be if Rꞌ = R. We can see this in (5),

29

The benchmark case of Rꞌ= 1.077 and G = 1.037 corresponds approximately to the row with Rꞌ/G = 1.04.
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which still holds here. With Rꞌ = R, f* = 1 and c* = cn, but with Rꞌ > R, f* < 1 and c* > cn.30
This is no surprise – it is certainly understood that a policy of high assumed returns is a policy of
“pay later,” i.e. generational inequity. Our contribution here is to shed further light on the
mechanism by which this occurs, and to show the order of magnitudes involved. The
mechanism is the steady-state amortization payments generated by the failure of the system to
reach full funding by the inflated ratio (let alone the true ratio) and that failure owes to the
inflated growth of measured liabilities (rather than the deflated measure of normal cost). The
magnitudes of the generational inequity generated by small deviations of assumed from true
returns (0.5 to 2.0 percentage point) may be surprising: 30 – 75 percent of the measured extra
burden of funding prior cohorts.

VII. Conclusion
The “80 percent standard” – mythical though its origins may be -- raises the possibility
that steady states may be sustainable with less than full funding. This is true. Indeed, steady
state funding ratios as low as zero may be sustainable, in a mathematical sense, if the funding
formula includes an amortization payment that adjusts outside of steady state (to provide
stability) and generates sufficient contributions in steady-state to help fund the benefits of prior
cohorts as well as the current cohort. I have shown here that the extra contributions for prior
cohorts – the generational inequity – takes a simple form in steady state: it is the steady-state
unfunded ratio times the difference between the pay-go rate and the normal cost.

30

Since (5) and (25) both hold in steady-state for c*, together they define the complex relationship between the
measured and true unfunded ratios, (1-fꞌ*) and (1-f*). Equivalently, we can use (3) and (17) to write ft/fꞌt = Lꞌt/Lt =
[(R-G)/(Rꞌ-G)][(cp – cnꞌ)/(cp – cn)]. Although, the steady-state value of the measured funded ratio does not depend on
the gaps among cp, cn, and cnꞌ, these do matter for the true funded ratio.
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I have also examined the determinants of the SS unfunded ratio under an “x-percent”
amortization formula (either formal or informal) and a policy of high assumed returns. Under an
x-percent amortization formula, the SS unfunded ratio (and, hence, the degree of generational
inequity), will exceed the target unfunded ratio. Thus, to achieve a 20 percent SS unfunded ratio
will require a target funded ratio for amortization of more than 80 percent; I calibrate it at about
94 percent under mean actuarial assumptions. Conversely, a target ratio of 80 percent for
amortization would result in an SS funded ratio of under 40 percent, and a 70 percent target – a
figure bandied about by some analysts – would lead to near-insolvency. This would impose
upon each cohort nearly the full extra burden of funding prior cohorts, mimicking the pay-go
system that actuarial funding was originally designed to replace.
Under a policy of high assumed returns, with a target funded ratio of 100 percent, the SS
funded ratio – even as inflated by the high discount rate – will fall short.31 I calibrate, under
mean actuarial assumptions, that if the goal is a 20 percent SS unfunded ratio as measured, the
true return can run half a percentage point below assumptions. However, the degree of
generational inequity (as measured) will not be 20 percent, but 30 percent. If the spread
between assumed and actual returns reaches 2 percentage points, the extra burden borne by each
cohort can easily reach 75 percent.
More generally, the main policy takeaway of my analysis is that the SS degree of
generational inequity is highly sensitive to the policies considered. The “80 percent” mantra
lends a spurious complacency regarding departures from sound finance: small deviations from
the 100 percent funding target or of the assumed return from true returns generate large degrees
of generational inequity.

31

The reasons for this result, not always understood, are independent of the deflated measure of normal cost.
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Figure 1
Steady-State vs. Target Funded Ratio

equation (10), 0 < R – G < s ≤ R; equation (14), s = (R-G)/[1-(G/R)N]
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0

0
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min

= (R-G)/s

Target Funded Ratio, f
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Table 1
Steady State Funded Ratios Under x-percent Funding Targets
(equation (14); N = 30)

R/G

1.02
1.03
1.039
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08

0.70
0.46
0.27
0.07

0.75
0.55
0.39
0.22

target funded ratio
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.64
0.73
0.82
0.51
0.64
0.76
0.38
0.53
0.69
0.14
0.35
0.57
0.14
0.43
0.24
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0.95
0.91
0.88
0.84
0.78
0.71
0.62
0.50

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Table 2
Steady State Measured Funded Ratios Under High Assumed Returns
(equation (24); N = 30)

R'/G

1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08

1.000
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

assumed/true rate of return, R'/R
1.005
1.010
1.015
1.020
0.83
0.71
0.62
0.55
0.80
0.67
0.58
0.51
0.78
0.63
0.54
0.47
0.74
0.59
0.49
0.42
0.71
0.55
0.45
0.38
0.67
0.50
0.40
0.34
0.62
0.45
0.36
0.29
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1.025
0.50
0.46
0.41
0.37
0.33
0.29
0.25

1.030
0.45
0.41
0.37
0.33
0.29
0.25
0.22

